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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 355 
Accident time: 08:29 Accident Date: 29/01/2001 
Where it occurred: Svay Donkeo village, 
Pursat District 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 12/02/2001 
ID original source: KC Name of source: MAG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: hard 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 525004 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: MF: M0344 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group made an internal investigation and made their report available. The 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Photographs were included in the original, 
but as photocopies of such a poor quality that they have not been included in this document. 
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Internal Accident investigator’s report 
1. Introduction 
On Monday 29th January 2001 an accident occurred in Svay Donkeo 2 minefield in Pursat 
District, which resulted in one deminer being injured following a small explosion. 
As the Head of the Training Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of [Demining group] Cambodia, I 
was tasked by the Senior Technical Advisor with conducting an accident investigation, and 
producing an accident report. 
I was unable to travel to the accident site on the day of the accident; therefore I visited the 
following day (30th Jan 2001), with the Senior Technical Advisor. On arrival at the accident 
site I was briefed by the Senior Technical Advisor on what information would be required and 
the conduct of the investigation. 
 
2. Investigation Timetable of Events 
The following timetable of events outline the sequence of events and actions conducted by 
the Investigator in compiling this report. 
0829 Hrs 29 Jan 2001 Accident Occurred 
0845 Hrs 29 Jan 2001 Accident Reported to STA 
1300 Hrs 29 Jan 2001 STA Faxed Initial Accident Report Format to Pursat FOM 
1600 Hrs 29 Jan 2001 FOM Pursat faxed back to STA completed Initial Report. 
1230 Hrs 30 Jan 2001 STA and Head of TMEU visit accident site 
1600 Hrs 30 Jan 2001 Head of TMEU took statements from all personnel involved 
O7OOHrs 31 Jan 2001 Quality Assurance Check conducted on area under 
clearance 
1300 Hrs 0l Feb 2001 STA issued Memo to All Operational Staff on PPE. 
1400 Hrs 02 Feb 2001 Head of TMEU submitted "Draft" Investigation Report. 
 
STA Note
Following submission of the Draft Investigation report by the Head of the TMEU to the STA. 
The STA rewrote the report into a more easily read version, as the Draft report was not a very 
user-friendly document due to the standard of written English. All the facts and points required 
for the report were present, however the language used was slightly confusing. This was to 
be expected, as this report was the first occasion that the Head of the TMEU has had to 
produce an Investigation Report, and highlights some training requirements for him in his 
current role. 
The STA finished the final report on 12 February 2001. 
 
3. Minefield Background 
Svay Donkeo 2 minefield was laid in close proximity to Svay Donkeo village in Bakan District 
of Pursat Province. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) designates the minefield as 
M0344. The minefield was initially laid as a protective minefield between the Khmer Rouge 
forces and Government forces: The area changed hands a number of times during the period 
from 1975-1979. In 1979 when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia the area of Svay 
Donkeo village was used as a military base by the Vietnamese. In 1987 the Vietnamese 
withdrew from the area and it was handed over to Government forces. It is reported that 
throughout the various periods from 1975 to 1987 the warring factions laid mines in Svay 
Donkeo. 
There have been a number of accidents in this minefield involving humans and cattle; paths 
through the minefield are used as access from the main road to the village of Svay Donkeo by 
the local villagers.  
As part of [Demining group]’s Pursat Province clearance plan it was identified that Svay 
Donkeo minefield was a high priority task and therefore should be undertaken during the Dry 
Season of 2001. 
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 4. Minefield Clearance Plan 
[The Demining group] began clearance of this minefield in June 2000 however the initial 
clearance had to be suspended due to the onset of the Wet Season. On 02 Jan 2001. Mine 
Action Team No. 2 from Pursat Province was deployed to this task to continue clearance 
during the Dry Season. 
The initial clearance plan is to clear the immediate area around the village of Svay Donkeo 
and the adjacent Pagoda complex. The first area cleared included the track which runs from 
the Pagoda complex to the village, running North to South through the minefield.  
The MAT team travel from Talou Deminer accommodation daily to the site, which means a 
travelling time of approximately 1 hour 15 minutes to and from the task. There are plans to 
establish deminer accommodation within the Pagoda complex at Svay Donkeo in early 
February 2001. 
To date only PMN-2 Anti Personnel Blast mines have been found in this minefield. 
 
5. Personnel involved in Accident 
Pursat Field Operations are managed by the Field Operations Manager. 
On the day of the accident Mine Action Team No 2 was being supervised by the regular 
supervisor for MAT 2. 
The demining pair involved in the accident were [the Victim] and [his partner]. 
The Trauma Care Medic of MAT 2 is [Medic 1] 
Statements from all personnel involved are contained in this report. [See Statements.] 
 
6. Accident Details 
At 0829 Hrs on Monday 29th January 200 1, a deminer from Mine Action Team Number 2 
from Pursat Province, was injured by a small explosion, at Svay Donkeo minefield. 
He was conducting Electronic Clearance drills as part of a two man demining pair, when he 
found an as yet unidentified metallic item which exploded in his hand when he picked it up. 
He reported in his statement that the item was lying on the surface of the area he himself had 
cleared the previous day. 
He described the item as being approximately 12 mm long, and l0mm in diameter, coloured 
Gold and looking like an earring. 
Following the explosion, he was immediately assisted by his partner, the MAT supervisor and 
the MAT Trauma Care Medic. 
After removing his protective equipment, the Trauma Care Medic inspected his injuries which 
were: - 
Traumatic Amputation of the left Index finger 
Traumatic Partial Amputation of the left thumb 
Blast injuries to right hand index finger and thumb 
Superficial fragmentation injuries to face 
See Photographs 7 and 8 [only poor photocopies were made available: not reproduced]. 
The medic then gave the deminer First Aid that consisted of; administering a l000ml 
Intravenous Drip, injecting him with penicillin and bandaging his wounds. The Trauma Care 
filled out the Casualty information sheet showing all vital signs etc (see attached Casualty 
Sheet). [See Medical report.] 
Within 15 minutes of the accident occurring he was transported to a local hospital.  
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On arrival at the local hospital called "Beung Khna", it was found that they did not have the 
required instruments to operate on his injured hands. He was then transferred to the 
Provincial Hospital in Pursat town. On arrival at the hospital the staff were on lunch break, 
therefore a local private Doctor was summoned to examine the deminers injuries. Later that 
afternoon the deminer was operated on by the medical staff of the Provincial Hospital. 
 
7. Conduct of Investigation 
On being tasked to conduct the investigation I travelled to Svay Donkeo minefield with the 
Senior Technical Advisor on Tuesday 30th Jan 2001.We arrived at the site at around 1230 
Hrs. 
The STA had previously informed the FOM to meet us at the site with MAT 2. 
On arrival I received a briefing from the STA on the conduction of the Investigation and the 
contents of the Accident Investigation report. We were shown the deminer’s protective 
equipment in the Parking Area and the fragment recovered from his jacket (see photographs 
5,and 6). [Not made available.] 
Myself; the STA and the FOM then visited the site after being briefed in the Parking area by 
the FOM and MAT Supervisor. 
We approached from the briefing area to the accident site. I took photographs from different 
locations to show the accident site and the surrounding area.(see photographs 1,2,3,4) 
[photographs not included]. 
I then inspected the area where the accident had happened with the STA. 
The area of the accident site was physically searched by the STA to see if any other items or 
fragments could be found, none were found at this stage. 
Following discussions at the accident site, I drew the sketch map of the accident site and 
checked the accuracy of the supervisors minefield sketch map. 
I then returned to the parking area, and instructed the FOM , Supervisor, Deminer No 2 and 
Trauma Care Medic, to report to Pursat Provincial Office at 1600 Hrs that day to give written 
statements for the report. 
Myself and the STA then travelled to Pursat Provincial Hospital to visit the injured deminer. 
We met the injured deminer in the hospital at approximately 15:00 Hrs, he was in good spirits 
and seemed to have been well cared for. His wife was on route from Battembang Province to 
see him. He was keen to be discharged from hospital so that he could be looked after at 
home. He was having understandable difficulty washing eating and going to the toilet due to 
both hands being bandaged. I briefed him that he was to report to the Pursat Provincial Office 
the next day following his hospital discharge to give a statement. We assured him that he 
would be sent home the following day if the Doctors gave him a letter of discharge. I also 
informed him that we would arrange transport, and regular medical checks at his home by the 
Senior Medical Officer Dr Chantry. [A discharge sheet was attached.] 
At I 6:00 I met with the FOM, MAT Supervisor, Deminer Number 2, and Trauma Care Medic 
to take their statements (see attached statements). 
On 31st Jan 2001 at 09:00 I took a statement from the injured deminer in Pursat Office. 
The Provincial Manager arranged for transport for the injured deminer to be transported home 
today. 
The STA instructed the FOM that MAT 2 could return to work on the 0l Feb 2001. He also 
instructed him to conduct random Quality Assurance checks at the site the next day. 
The Quality Assurance checks only produced some small fragments from the accident site' 
which were remnants of the item which exploded; these fragments were so small that they did 
not help in the identification of the item. 
I submitted my draft Investigation report to the STA on Friday 02 Feb 2001. 
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8. Investigators Observations at Clearance Task Site 
Minefield Site 
This task is well laid out and the supervisor has a clear plan of how the task is to be 
conducted. All perimeter marking is well maintained and easily understood. The minefield 
sketch map is accurate and well maintained. The MAT deminers have been well briefed on 
the task, and understand the clearance plan. The pairs are deployed sensibly and within the 
safety distances laid down in [Demining group] Cambodia SOPS. 
 
Accident Site 
The site of the accident is adjacent to the previously cleared track which bisects the minefield 
from North to South, from the Pagoda complex to the Village.  
The item found was approximately 0.5 metre from the edge of the track, and just outside the 
unclear area where the injured deminer was working prior to the accident. 
The ground was hard and very dry. 
The area which had been cleared the previous day had been dug over and I could see where 
excavations had been carried out to locate signal readings. 
The Quality Assurance check found only fragments of the item which exploded and nothing 
else. 
 
9. Investigators Conclusions 
Following my investigation I came to the following conclusions. 
I. The item which exploded was not something that the deminer had come across 
previously, and as yet we are still unsure as to its exact identity. It is possible that it was a 
type of detonator from a munition which had been disassembled for scrap purposes, and then 
discarded in the area. 
2. During the day prior to the accident, there had been a large influx of people into the 
area to attend the nearby theatre, and it is possible that one of these people brought the item 
to the area. The track which runs through the minefield would have been heavily trafficked 
during this time. Therefore someone could easily have dropped or thrown the item from the 
track to the cleared area which is a distance of only 0.5 metre. 
3. The deminer did not recognize the item as being part of any explosive device he has 
previously encountered 
4. Although the item was found in the cleared area, I do not think it had been missed the 
previous day, the deminer stated that he had found it easily, and that it was lying on the 
surface and was clean and bright. 
5. The First Aid given to the deminer by the Trauma Care Medic was of a good quality. 
6. The Personal Protective Jacket being worn by the deminer at the time of the accident 
did protect him as can be seen from photograph number 6, where the fragment was lodged in 
his chest area. If this fragment had penetrated at the ' point of impact it would have entered 
the chest cavity. However his helmet and visor were not fitted correctly, which meant he 
received facial injuries. He is very lucky fragments did not blind him. (See photo 8 for facial 
injuries.) [Photos not provided.] 
7. The site was well marked and the perimeter marking was well maintained. 
8. The overall layout of the minefield was well thought out and well disciplined. 
9. The Trauma Care Medic would have been in a difficult position if the accident had 
been caused by a 'missed’ mine as he ran straight to the site to assist the injured man. 
10. The hospital where the casualty was initially taken to did not have the facilities to deal 
with what was a fairly minor injury. 
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11. At the Provincial Hospital, the FOM had to get a private Doctor to attend the patient, 
as there was no Doctor at lunchtime in the Hospital. 
12. There are concerns over the level of Medical facilities and their ability to deal with 
even fairly minor casualties. 
13. This is a very unfortunate accident which could have happened to anyone who picked 
up this item. 
 
10. Investigators Recommendations 
1. All operational staff should be reminded of the importance of wearing PPE correctly, 
the PPE is designed to give maximum protection only if it is correctly fitted. 
2. A review of all support medical facilities in all the provinces should be conducted by 
the Senior Medical Officer and a report submitted to the Senior Technical Advisor. 
3. All Trauma Care Medic posts should be located out with the minefield, and all Trauma 
Care Medics should be briefed not to enter the minefield in the event of an accident. The 
patient should be brought to the medic for treatment. 
4. Standard Operating Procedures on Casualty Evacuation, Medical Support Facilities, 
and Accident Investigation should be reviewed and, and if  necessary rewritten as part of the 
current rewrite of SOPS being conducted by the Senior Technical Advisor. 
5. The deminer injured should be medically examined by the Senior Medical Officer 
prior to returning to work after sick leave. 
6. The injured deminer should be given refresher training by the TMEU before returning 
to work after sick leave. 
Signed: Head of he TMEU 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 452 Name: Name removed 
Age: 37 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 6 hours 31 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Face 
severe Hands 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Fingers  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
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Medical report 
The victim was taken to a hospital without surgical facilities and sent on. On release from the 
first hospital, a “release form” was filled out. The “release form” and the field medic’s 
statement are reproduced below (edited for anonymity). 
 
Victim’s first hospital release form 
The victim's name: [excised], Sex: Male, Age: 37 years old. 
Team: MAT 2,   Blood Group: B+ 
Accident place: Svay Donkeo, Date: 29 January 01, At : 8:29 Hrs. 
Reason of Accident: Detonator explosion. 
Type of Accident: Lost index finger and thumb of the left hand and damaged to the right index 
finger and thumb. 
Situation of victim when the accident was immediately occurred: Normal. 
Diagnose pre treatment: Blood pressure: 11/7, pulse: 65, Breath: 24, Temperature: 36,5. 
Treatment: 
Syrup: Rigerlactated 1000m= 1.5 ac. 
Other: Ampicilline ]00000ui = 2 vial 
Diagnosis post treatment: 
Pressure: 11/7, Pulse: 65, Breath: 24, temp. 36.5 oc 
Victim situation: Normal 
Follow up the diagnose on sending to hospital: 
At: 8:58 hrs blood pressure l1/7 pulse: 65, Breath: 24: Temp. 36,5 
At: 9.. 20 hrs blood pressure: 11/7, pulse: 65, Breath: 24, Temp. 36.5 
Send to: Pursat hospital, at 11:25 hrs. 
Trauma Care medic, Signature. 
 
MEDIC statement 
This statement was taken at Pursat Provincial Office on 30th Jan 2001. 
When the team started working I prepared my medical equipment at the Trauma Care post. 
At 0829Hrs I heard a small explosion. The number 2 of one of the demining pairs called me 
and I ran to where the explosion had happened. 
When I arrived [the Deminer No.2] was bringing the injured deminer towards me, we took him 
to the safe area and then the supervisor arrived. We removed the deminers PPE, and I 
started to check his injuries. 
The deminer had all but lost his left index finger and part of his left thumb; he had slight 
injuries to his right index finger and thumb, and some injuries to his face. The injuries to his 
face were mainly around his nose, chin and right eye. He was very lucky that no damage had 
been done to his eyes. 
I spent around 15 minutes giving him First Aid, bandaging his hands, giving him l000ml IV drip 
and injecting him with penicillin. 
Once the First Aid was complete, we transported the deminer to Beung Khna hospital in 
Pursat, we arrived at 0920 Hrs, and the doctor there inspected the deminer for about 45 mins 
and told me that he did not have the right instruments to operate. 
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Therefore we took the deminer to the Provincial Hospital however the staff were on their lunch 
break, so I arranged for a doctor from a private clinic to examine the deminer. At 1500 Hrs the 
Provincial Hospital staff operated on the deminer. Following the operation I stayed with the 
deminer until he was fully awake, then I returned to the deminer accommodation at Talou. 
Signed. 
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems likely that the 
item had been placed on the cleared ground by a member of the public – possibly in the belief 
that the deminers would know what to do with it and that this was a responsible way to 
dispose of the item. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim’s visor was 
raised – possibly in order to examine the item clearly – and the visor should be down at all 
times when deminers are in working lanes. 
Although the investigator described the unknown device as a “detonator”, I have called it a 
fuze because it presumably included a means of initiating the detonator. This implies 
inadequate training because the item involved was an explosive device including a detonator 
and the Victim did not recognise it. 
 
Statements 
Statements from personnel involved in the accident are reproduced below (edited for 
anonymity). 
 
The Victim 
This statement was taken at Pursat Provincial Office on 31st Jan 2001. 
On 29th Jan 2001, we started working at 07:00. I started as the Number 1 of the demining 
pair, conducting clearance of the minefield. At 07:30 I changed with [my partner] and he acted 
as the Number 1. 
At 08:00, I took over from [my partner] as the Number 1 and continued to conduct Electronic 
Clearance. After a period of time, I moved the test piece, and was conducting the detector 
check in the cleared area when I picked up a strong signal from the detector search head. 
I used the detector to focus on the source of the signal and saw an item on the surface of the 
ground which I thought was an ear-ring. I put the detector down and stooped to pick up the 
item to see what it was. 
I had picked the item up in my left hand using my thumb and index finger. It appeared to be 
about 12mm long and 10mm in diameter, it was coloured like gold and seemed very 
attractive. I wanted to put the item into my right hand to examine it more closely, as I was 
doing so it exploded. 
Immediately after the explosion I stood up and shouted "Oh I have had an accident". My 
partner ran to me from the observation area, followed by the Supervisor and Trauma Care 
Medic. 
The Supervisor, [my partner] and the medic, took me to the safe area and removed my 
Personal Protective Equipment. At this point the medic gave me First Aid by giving me an IV 
drip penicillin and bandaging my hands. l was then transported to the hospital. 
I was fully aware of my surroundings throughout the period. 
I had personally cleared the area were the item was found the previous day, and I can only 
think that the item had been thrown there by someone passing through the minefield. That 
day and the previous day many many people had been in the area of the nearby theatre to 
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see the show. I think someone from this group must have transported the item there, although 
I do not understand how they could do this without the item exploding. 
[The Victim]  could not sign his statement as both hands are injured 
 
SUPERVISOR 
This statement was taken at Pursat Provincial Office on 30th Jan 2001. 
On 29th Jan 2001, I left Talou deminer accommodation at 05:40 with the MAT. We arrived at 
Svay Donkeo minefield at 07:00. I gave the MAT a 15 minute briefing on the days work and 
SOPS before they were deployed. The normal partner of [the Victim] was detached to 
Kompon Speu province, so I tasked [Deminer No.2] to work with him. 
After the MAT started work I walked around the site checking that all marking etc was in 
order. Whilst I was walking around I heard a small explosion in the area where [the Victim and 
his partner] were deployed. 
I stopped the rest of the team working immediately. 
I immediately went to the area of the explosion and assisted [the medic] to take [the Victim] to 
the safe area for First Aid treatment. 
I informed the Field Operations Manager of the accident by VHF radio at 08:33 Hrs. 
I then arranged for the deminer to be transported with the Trauma Care Medic to hospital in 
Pursat. Myself and the remainder of the team waited at the minefield for the Field Operations 
Manager to arrive. 
When [he] arrived I showed him the location of the accident and we took photographs. We 
found that there was a piece of fragmentation embedded in the deminers protective, jacket. 
Following the photograph taking, myself and the rest of the team returned to Talou 
accommodation. 
Signed. 
 
DEMINER No.2 
This statement was taken at Pursat Provincial Office on 30th Jan 2001. 
On 29th Jan 2001,we started work at 07:15 Hrs. I was working with [the Victim] and he started 
as the number 1 of the pair. We swapped over at 07:45 Hrs and again at 08:15 Hrs. 
I was observing [the Victim] when he moved some cut vegetation to the pile and then he was 
testing the detector when he saw something. 
He then squatted down and it looked like he was trying to pick something up in the clear area, 
then all of a sudden there was a small explosion. 
I then ran to [the Victim] and helped him to the safe area; I could see that both of his hands 
were injured. I helped him remove his protective equipment and the detector as this was still 
with him. 
Then the Trauma Care Medic gave him First Aid and he was transported to hospital. 
I then waited with the rest of the team for the Field Operations Manager to arrive. 
Signed. 
 
FIELD OPERATIONS MANAGER 
This statement was taken at Pursat Provincial Office on 30th Jan 2001. 
On 29th Jan 2001, I was in the deminer accommodation at Talou. At 0833Hrs I received a 
radio message from MAT 2 at Svay Donkeo minefield to inform me that an accident had 
occurred. I was informed that one deminer had been injured. I was informed that an explosion 
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involving an unidentified item which was about l2mm long and l0mm in diameter had caused 
the injuries. 
I then passed a radio message to Battembang Regional Office and asked her to pass the 
information to the STA and Regional Manager Battembang. Whilst I. was talking to her, FOM 
Bartembang was there and he told me he would pass the messages on to Phnom Pehn. 
Once I had passed these messages I travelled with the Ambulance to Beung Khna Hospital 
and met the deminer there. I spoke with the District Doctor and he said that they did not have 
the right instruments for the operation required. Therefore I sent the deminer to the Pursat 
Provincial Hospital. 
I then travelled to Svay Donkeo minefield and met with the remainder of the MAT at the 
parking area. I conducted an interview with the number 2 of the demining pair, and then 
myself and the supervisor inspected the accident site. 
Following this I spoke with the local villagers. 
I then told the team to return to Talou, and I returned to Pursat office. On arrival I received the 
Initial Accident Report format which had been faxed by the STA. I completed the report and 
faxed it to Phnom Pehn. 
I was then informed that the STA would visit the next day and conduct an accident 
investigation with the Head of the TMEU Koy Chomrong. 
I believe that someone passing by threw the item into the cleared area 
Signed. 
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